Squid
- Funds lost
- $90K
- Attack type
- Other
- Network
- Ethereum, BNB Chain, Base, Arbitrum
- Category
- Exchange (DEX)
Summary
On October 7, 2025, Squid Router contracts across multiple chains (BSC, Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, and Optimism) were exploited for approximately $90,000+ due to a simple logic bug in the sponsorOrderUsingPermit2() function. Multiple attackers, some funded through Tornado Cash, drained USDT and USDC tokens by exploiting incorrect token variable handling in the contract's permit2 implementation.
Details of the Exploit
The vulnerability existed in the sponsorOrderUsingPermit2() function, which allows users to create orders using offline-signed permit2 signatures. The critical flaw was that the function incorrectly used the token variable from the permit data structure instead of the from token specified in the order structure. This mismatch allowed attackers to manipulate which tokens were transferred, enabling unauthorized drainage of contract funds.
In contrast, the createOrder() and sponsorOrder() functions correctly used tokens from the order data structure, highlighting this as an isolated implementation bug. The exploit was executed across five blockchains with varying losses: BSC ($38,000), Ethereum ($21,000), Arbitrum ($22,000), Base ($8,000), and Optimism (~$3,000). Multiple attackers participated, including MEV bots and Tornado Cash-funded addresses, suggesting the vulnerability was quickly identified and exploited by different actors.
Source: De.Fi REKT Database. Data as of November 19, 2026.
Related incidents
- ZetaChain: $334K lost, April 27, 2026
- Aperture Finance: $3.7M lost, January 25, 2026
- SwapNet: $17.0M lost, January 25, 2026