Ink Finance
- Funds lost
- $140K
- Attack type
- Access Control
- Network
- Polygon
- Category
- Other
Summary
On May 11, 2026, Ink Finance’s Workspace Treasury Proxy on Polygon was exploited for approximately $140,000 USDT. The attack leveraged a missing access control check in a payroll distribution contract, allowing the attacker to register themselves as a whitelisted claimer. The exploit was amplified by a $25,000 flash loan to drain the treasury’s dormant funds.
Details of the Exploit
The exploit was rooted in a critical logic flaw within the addUsers function of the protocol's PayrollDistribution contract. This function lacked proper access control, permitting any user to register addresses for existing reward "drops" and set arbitrary payment amounts. The attacker deployed a malicious contract and registered it as an eligible claimer with an inflated totalAmount.
To maximize the payout, the attacker utilized a $25,000 flash loan from Balancer V2 to satisfy balance-sensitive checks within the claim path. Because the treasury proxy implicitly trusted the approval signaled by the vulnerable controller, it released approximately $140,000 in USDT to the attacker. The funds were originally sourced via the Railgun privacy protocol on Ethereum before being bridged to Polygon shortly before the attack.
Source: De.Fi REKT Database. Data as of November 19, 2026.
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